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Abstract. The recent literature about the so called brain drain assumes that destination 
countries are characterized not only by higher wages than the source country, but also by 
a higher or at least not lower relative return to skill. As this assumption has a doubtful 
empirical validity, we assess whether the main prediction of this literature, namely the 
possibility of a beneficial brain gain, still holds under the reverse assumption. We show 
that there is still a case for a beneficial brain drain. Immigration policies that are biased 
against unskilled workers are not necessary for a beneficial brain drain to occur once one 
considers that agents face heterogeneous migration costs. 
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The recent literature on the brain drain has evidenced that the opportunity to 
migrate can increase the human capital endowment of the sending countries 
because, so the reasoning goes, “higher prospective returns to skills in a foreign 
country impinge on skill acquisition decisions at home” (Stark et al., 1997). A 
higher skill premium – both in relative and absolute terms - in the destination 
country represents a necessary condition for a beneficial brain drain to occur in 
Stark et al. (1997), while most of this literature assumes that the skill premium is 
higher at destination in absolute terms, and constant across countries in relative 
terms (e.g. Mountford, 1997; Vidal, 1998; Beine et al., 2001). This contrasts with 
the literature on the self-selection of immigrants, where the relative skill 
premium is assumed to be lower in destination countries (e.g. Borjas, 1987; 
Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005).  
Recently, Egger and Felbermayr (2007) claimed – in line with Stark et al. (1997) 
- that there is no room for a beneficial brain drain if one conversely assumes that 
the relative skill premium is lower in the destination country. Such a conclusion 
could be potentially disruptive for the empirical relevance of the main prediction 
of this strand of literature, since it is a stylized fact – as Figure 1 shows – that the 
relative skill premium is inversely related with the income level of a country.
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Source: authors’ elaboration on Freeman and Oostendorp (2000). 
 
The objective of this paper is to show that the case for a beneficial brain drain 
actually does not hinge on any assumption about the skill premium. We 
demonstrate that a beneficial brain drain can occur even if the skill premium is 
                                          
1 We follow Belot and Hatton (2008) for the identification of the sets of skilled and unskilled occupations.  
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lower in the destination than it is in the sending country, provided that one 
realistically considers that migration costs are heterogeneous across agents. This 





Consider a small isolated economy populated by one-period lived agents, who 
maximize a utility function that is linear in income. Agents have to decide 
whether to invest in education, and they face different educational costs due to 
heterogeneous innate learning abilities. As in Docquier and Rapoport (2007), an 
agent has to forego a fraction (1-η) of the wage of a skilled worker in order to get 
an education, where η is uniformly distributed over the support [0,1]. 
Skilled and unskilled workers are given exogenous probabilities p and q to 
migrate to a high-wage country, with q=(1-s)p and  ∈ s [0,1]. The parameter s 
measures the selectivity of the immigration policies: the higher s, the larger the 
bias against unskilled workers. The selectivity can influence the incentives to 
invest in education, as agents are induced to invest in education “in order to be 
eligible for emigration” (Mountford, 1997).  
We assume that agents face heterogeneous migration costs: migration costs 
amount to a fraction δ of the foreign wage, where δ uniformly distributed over the 
support [0,1] independently from η.
2 We assume that the his own realizations of 
δ and η are known to each worker before he takes any educational or migration 
decision.  
In line with the literature, we assume that the labor supply of both skilled and 
unskilled workers is inelastic, while - differently from all papers but Egger and 
Felbermayr (2007) - we assume that skilled and unskilled workers are 
complementary production factors. The literature assumes either that labor is 
supplied by homogeneous workers (Mountford, 1997; Vidal, 1998), or that labor 
is supplied by heterogeneous workers whose skills are perfectly substitutable 
(Beine  et al., 2001; Docquier and Rapoport, 2007). While these assumptions 
entail that the high-wage destination country offers a relative skill premium that 
is not lower than the one prevailing at home, our modeling choice allows us to 
consider the case where the relative skill premium is higher at home. 
                                          
2 The main result of the model would not change if we assumed that migration costs are fixed rather than 
proportional, a specification that appears to be better able to explain the observed self-selection of international 
migrants Grogger and Hanson (2008).  
 
3 
Domestic production takes place through an aggregate production function that is 
homogenous of degree one in skilled and unskilled workers. Factor markets are 
perfectly competitive, and each type of labor is paid its marginal product.  
The small economy assumption entails that foreign wages for skilled and 
unskilled workers, 
* wh  and 
* wl , are insensitive to immigration from the domestic 
country. We employ  ( ) wh h and  ( ) wh l to denote domestic wages which are 
endogenously determined by h, the ratio of the Lebesgue measure of the set of 
domestically employed skilled workers over the Lebesgue measure of the set of 
domestically employed unskilled workers. We omit time subscripts for notational 
ease, we normalize  ( ) wh l  to 1 and  assume that foreign wages are higher than 
domestic ones for both skill groups. 
Each worker regards domestic wages as unaffected by his own educational and 
migration choices; thus, for any given expected value of h, an unskilled agent is 















while a skilled agent is willing to migrate only if: 
 












An agent characterized by a realization of δ higher than δl (h) and  δh(h) does not 
opt for migration, hence only domestic wages influence his educational decision; 
he decides to invest in education only if: 
 
[3]  () () () () {} ( ⎤ η>ηδ = δ∈ δ δ ⎦
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If δ is intermediate between δl (h) and δh (h), then only one of the two possible 
educational decisions will induce an agent to migrate; this implies that he will 
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Finally, an agent whose parameter δ is lower than  δl (h) and δh(h) would always 
opt for a foreign employment, hence he decides to become skilled only if: 
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ψ(h) represents the actual value of h that arises from a given expectation of h 
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A certain value of h can represent an equilibrium only if expectations are fulfilled: 
 
[7]  () =ψ hh  
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It can be easily verified that an equilibrium value of h exists, and it is unique. 
When the economy is closed to migration Eq. [6] reduces to: 
 
[8]  ( ) ( )
== ψ= −
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We denote with h
c the value of h that satisfies Eq. [8].  
 
Immigration policies and the domestic equilibrium 
 
We depart from the relevant literature assuming that the relative skill premium is 
higher in the domestic closed economy equilibrium than abroad: 
 












A fully anticipated change in either p or s determines a shift of the function ψ(h); 
given Eq. [7], an upward (downward) shift determines an increase (decrease) in 
the equilibrium level of h. A priori, it is not possible to determine the sign of the 
partial derivative of ψ(h) with respect to either p or s, has both variables exert 
two distinct and contrasting effects upon ψ(h). Figure 2 shows that a ban on 
unskilled migration, s=1, improves the incentives to invest in education, as a 
portion of η(δ,h) moves downwards as p increases, and the set of skilled workers 
who invest in education with any p>0 is larger than the level that characterizes 
the closed-economy equilibrium. Adopting the jargon introduced by Beine et al. 
(2001), we can say that an increase in p determines a beneficial brain effect, 
which is counteracted – and possibly offset – by a negative drain effect, as the 
share of skilled workers who migrate is higher than the corresponding share of 
unskilled workers, which is actually zero. A converse reasoning applies to a 
general immigration policy, s=0, while for any intermediate degree of selectivity, 
0<s<1, it is not possible to determine the sign of either of the two effects. 
 
The case for a beneficial brain drain 
 
The previous discussion suggests that migration probabilities interact in a 
complex way in influencing the domestic skill composition. This is why the 





Lemma 1. The partial derivative of ψ(h) with respect to p is an affine function of 
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Proof. [see the annex] 
 
 
Lemma 1 entails that the impact of a marginal change in the probability to 
migrate p upon the equilibrium skill composition of the domestic workforce is a 
linear function of the degree of selectivity of immigration policies, when p 
approaches zero. If the partial derivative of ψ(h) with respect to p is positive in a 
neighborhood of zero, then the equilibrium level of h is – at least for low 
migration probabilities – higher than the one emerging in the closed-economy 
case.  
Lemma 1 also entails that a beneficial brain drain occurs – at least for low levels 




Proposition 1. For any closed-economy equilibrium, there is a non-empty set in 
the  ()
** , lh ww  space such that a beneficial brain drain occurs under a general 
immigration policy. 
 
Proof. From the definitions of the two parameters we have that: 
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Observe that α+β is continuous in the foreign high skill wage. Assume now that 
* wh  is such that the foreign skill premium is the same as in the domestic 
closed-economy equilibrium, i.e.  ( )
*c * ww h w = hh l . Under this assumption, the 
expression for α+β becomes: 
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With some algebraic manipulations, the above expression simplifies to: 
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As  α+β is continuous in the 
* wh , it is possible to find values of 
* wh  lower than 
()
c* whw hl , such that α+β is still positive. This proves the Proposition.□ 
 
Proposition 1 demonstrates that a beneficial brain drain can occur even though 
the skill premium is lower in destination countries, and the immigration policies 
do not provide any incentive to invest in education. Heterogeneity in migration 
costs drives this result, while if we had considered homogeneous migration costs 
– as in Egger and Felbermayr (2007) – we would have concluded that a general 
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Proof of Lemma 1. We can compute the partial derivative of ψ(h) with respect 
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The limit of Eq. [A1] for p that converges to zero is given by: 
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From Eqs. [3]-[5] and Eq. [9], the integral that appears on the right hand side of 
Eq. [A2] can be expressed as: 
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where the integral of  () ,h ηδ for  ( ) 0, h ⎡ ⎤ δ∈ δ ⎣ ⎦ h  has been obtained through integration 




() ( ) ()
() () ()
()













1s w wh w wh 1
ln
p p wh p w wh w
1 sp w ww h p 1 sww h w w w h 1
      





∂η δ ∂ δ ⎡⎤ −− ⎢⎥ =− + ⎢⎥ ∂ +− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦

























∂η δ ∂ δ ⎡⎤ + − − ⎢⎥ =− δ − δ − δ + δ − δ ⎢⎥ ∂ ⎡⎤ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
∫
1
*c * *c *
cc c c c 0
2 cc * c p0 c
,h
wwh w ww h w1 1
lim 1 s h h h h h
p wh wh 2 w wh 2w h
lh h hh l
lh h h h
hh h h h
 
 
where we have applied De L’Hôpital theorem twice as the limit presented an 
undetermined form. Finally, plugging Eq. [A5] into Eq. [A2], and with some 
algebraic manipulations we get: 
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This proves the Lemma.□ 
 
 